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A recent increase in the level and volatility of regional natural gas prices has followed an 
extensive discussion on potential returns from short-term LNG trading and potentially 
fostering integration of geographically sparse regional gas markets.  This paper examines the 
stochastic properties of US natural gas and crude oil prices and considers their implications 
for the risks and returns to spot LNG trading, as opposed to a conventional practice of 
trading under long-term supply/purchase arrangement, in the Asia-pacific region.  The model 
of commodity price dynamics estimated for the daily spot prices of Henry Hub natural gas 
and crude oil (Brent) indicates strong seasonal pattern in mean and volatility of natural gas 
price whereas the crude oil price exhibits almost no seasonal variation in its level and 
volatility.  After controlling for such seasonality, the two prices exhibit only moderate 
correlation.  The simulation model constructed around the depicted price dynamics implies 
positive expected returns from arbitraging spatial price differences between Asia and the US 
whereas the volatility of revenue is only moderately higher for short-term trading than for 
forward contracting.  Besides, while the option to choose from multiple regional markets 
increases the overall volatility of revenue from short-tem trading, it reduces the downside 
risk substantially, with the revenue exceeding the level under forward trading more than 90% 
of time.  A positive return from the short-term LNG trading with reasonably low risk will 
provide an incentive to LNG producers in Asia-Pacific region to shift from conventional long-
term supply arrangement to short-term trading. 
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Two major changes in the world natural gas market have been emphasized in the last decade.  
First, the level and volatility of regional natural gas prices, in particular, the US and Europe, 
have increased dramatically.  Second, costs for liquefaction, shipping, and regasification of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) have decreased substantially.  These observations have followed 
an extensive discussion on potential gains from short-term LNG trading and resulting 
integration of geographically sparse regional gas markets.  It has been often reported that the 
amount of spot LNG transaction has been increasing gradually and more flexible contractual 
arrangements have been more common among LNG traders (EIA, 2003, IEA 2005).   
While recent changes and future prospects of the world gas market have been discussed 
extensively, there has been a little attempt to elucidate analytically how observed changes in 
world gas market affect a practice of LNG trading and lead traders to shift from conventional 
long-term supply/purchase arrangements into short-term trading.  Naturally, whether a firm, 
either seller or buyer, trades forward or in spot markets depends on the relative magnitudes 
of returns and risks associated with each of the two trading strategies.  This paper aims to 
examine the stochastic properties of the US natural gas and crude oil prices and consider their 
implications for the risks and returns from the short-term LNG trading in Asia-pacific region. 
Within a premature literature on the world LNG market, Hayes (2006) has examined the 
values of flexible LNG supply in Atlantic regions.  In particular, he has analyzed the gains to 
an LNG producer who has a supply commitment to the US market at a predetermined price 
but diverts its shipment to the European market when the spot price is higher in the latter 
than in the former market.  This value is calculated as the sum, over a certain period, of the 
spot price differentials between the two markets.  He obtains the distribution of the gains 
from spatial arbitrage in two steps:  first, to estimate mean-reversion models of the US and 
European gas prices, and second, to generate the simulated price series from the estimated 
mean-reversion models and obtain the Monte Carlo distribution of the gains from arbitraging 
price difference between the US and European market.   
In this paper, I follow the same two step approach as in Hayes (2006) in evaluating the 
gains from short-term trading in Asia-Pacific region.  However, unlike Hayes (2006), I 
evaluate the gains from short-term trading as opposed to a conventional practice of long-term 
supply/purchase arrangement.  This value differs from the values of flexible LNG supply 
examined by Hayes (2006).  A trading strategy considered in Hayes (2006) requires the 
presence of well-developed spot gas market because the LNG producer, when it deviates 
from its forward supply commitment, needs to replace the reduced gas delivery to the US 
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with the pipeline gas purchased in the US spot market.  The strategy is impracticable in Japan 
or any other markets in Asia, due to the absence of well-developed spot gas markets in the 
region.  Therefore, this paper considers the case where an LNG producer cannot divert from 
its forward supply commitment.  In such circumstance, the firms decision to shift from a 
conventional long-term supply/purchase arrangement to short-term trading depends on the 
relative magnitude of the revenue from these two trading strategies.  The analysis in this 
paper evaluates the revenues under the two trading scenarios.  This comparison is in line 
with a recent discussion about potential benefit from short-term trading, in the context of 
LNG producers located in Asia-Pacific region. 
Evaluation of the revenues from two trading strategies is also complicated because the 
forward LNG price is stochastic at the time of forward trading, as it is often linked to the spot 
price of an alternative fuel.  This forward price risk can be mitigated by cross-hedging with 
the futures markets of an alternative fuel to which the forward price is linked under forward 
contract.  This strategy, though not discussed previously in the context of LNG trading, is 
possible because futures contracts for an alternative fuel, such as crude oil, are actively traded 
through an organized exchange, for example, NYMEX.1  Such hedging strategy also reduces, 
albeit partially, the spot price risk to the extent that the regional gas price is correlated with 
the spot price of an alternative fuel.  I evaluate the revenue from the two trading strategies 
(spot or forward) under each of the two scenarioswith or without cross-hedging with 
futures markets.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 examines the revenue stream to a 
hypothetical LNG producer under each of two trading strategies; short-term trading and 
forward trading.  For each of the two strategies, I also consider the case where the producer 
hedges its price risk with the futures markets of an alternative fuel.  Section 3 describes the 
model that simulates the revenue to a hypothetical LNG producer located in North West 
Shelf (NWS), Australia.  The section starts with the estimation of the model of spot price 
dynamics for the Henry Hub natural gas and Brent crude oil.  The estimated models are then 
used to generate the simulated gas and oil price data.  The distribution of the revenue under 
each trading strategies is then obtained based on the simulated price data.  Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Hedging with futures contracts for natural gas is even more straightforward for an LNG producer 
supplying into the US market.  
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2. RISKS AND RETURNS TO SPATIAL ARBITRAGE THROUGH SPOT TRADING 
 
The analysis presented in this paper compares the revenue to an LNG producer under two 
trading strategies; short-term trading and long-term forward trading.  It also considers the 
case where the producer hedges its price risk, either spot or forward, with futures market of 
an alternative fuel to which the forward LNG price is linked.  Suppose that an LNG producer 
has the capacity to produce Q units of LNG per period.  If the producer operates at its full 
capacity, its revenue under each of the two trading strategies is, 
 
(1) TRF = FLNG Q 
(2) TRS = Pmax Q 
 
where TRi is the revenue to the producer with subscript i = F (S) representing that the 
producer supplies under forward contracting (short-term trading).  FLNG is the forward price 
of LNG, linked to the spot price of an alternative fuel.  Pmax = max{PLNG,j} is the maximum of 
the spot gas prices in J regional markets and PLNG,j is the spot LNG price in market j (j = 1, , 
J), net of transportation cost.  One of J regional markets, market 1, is the market to which the 
producer supplies under forward contract.   
The spot price in (2) can be decomposed into, 
 
(2) TRS = TRS1 + TRS2 = (Pmax − PLNG,1) Q + PLNG,1 Q 
 
where TRS1 and TRS2 represent, respectively, the gains from arbitraging the spot price 
differentials and the revenue, had the producer supplied only to the market 1 in spot market.  
TRS1 is non-negative while TRS2 is above or below the revenue from forward sales and 
depends on the realizations of demand, supply, and other market conditions as they 
determine the two prices, FLNG and PLNG,1.  The two prices can differ even on average if the 
LNG pricing formula is not specified to represent the expectation of regional gas market 
conditions.   
The forward price, FLNG, is stochastic at the time of forward trading since the spot price of 
an alternative fuel, say crude oil, is not observable.  However, it tends to be less volatile than 
the spot gas price in market 1 for two reasons.  First, the spot price of an alternative fuel, say 
crude oil, is less volatile than the spot gas price as it is traded in much bigger market than any 
regional gas markets.  Second, the LNG pricing formula is usually defined so that the LNG 
prices are insensitive to the variations in crude oil price.   
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The forward price risk can be mitigated through cross-hedging with futures markets for 
an alternative fuel to which the LNG forward price is linked.  The size of futures position 
depending on the conversion factor used in the LNG pricing formula.  For example, suppose 
that the LNG forward price is linked to the spot crude oil price through a linear function, FLNG 
= a + bPCO where PCO is the spot price of crude oil in the period of physical delivery of LNG.2  
In period 0, when the producer signs a forward contract, the producer can take a short 
position, in the amount b per unit of its LNG supply, in the crude oil futures contract 
maturing in period 1, when the physical delivery of LNG takes place.  It then clears its 
position as the contract approaches its maturity.  Let fCO,s denote the futures price, as in period 
s, of crude oil maturing in period 1.  The total revenue to the LNG producer becomes, 
 
(3) TRFC = b(PCO − fCO,1) Q + (a + b fCO,0) Q 
 
The last term in the right hand size of (3) is deterministic at the time of forward contracting.  
PCO − fCO,1 is the difference between the spot and futures price of crude oil in period 1, which is 
zero theoretically because, if the market is efficient, the futures price converges to the spot 
price as it approaches the maturity. 
The strategy reduces the volatility of the future revenue dramatically.  The expected 
values and variance of the total revenue, when the LNG producer enters into a long-term 
supply arrangement, are, without cross-hedging, 
 
(4) E[TRF] = E[FLNG] Q = (a + bE[PCO]) Q  
  V[TRF] = V[FLNG] Q2 = (b Q)2 V[PCO]  
 
and with cross-hedging, 
 
(5) E[TRFC] = b Q E[PCO − fCO,1] + (a + b fCO,0) Q = (a + b fCO,0) Q 
 V[TRFC] = (b Q)2 V[PCO − fCO,1] = 0 
 
where the last equalities in (5) hold when E[PCO − fCO,1] = V[PCO − fCO,1] = 0.  The expected 
revenue is also identical if the futures price of crude oil is equal to the period 0 expectation of 
crude oil price.  
                                                        
2 The strategy eliminates the spot price risk completely as long as the slope coefficient in the LNG 
pricing formula is constant over the level of crude oil price. 
5 
The same cross-hedging strategy can be employed when the LNG producer supplies 
under short-term trading.3  With cross-hedging, the firms revenue becomes,4 
 
(6) TRSC = (Pmax − b fCO,1) Q + b fCO,0 Q 
 
which can be decomposed into, 
 
(6) TRSC = TRSC1 + TRSC2 + TRSC3 = (Pmax − PLNG,1) Q + (PLNG,1 − a − b fCO,1) Q + (a + b fCO,0) Q 
 
where the three components represent: (i) gains from arbitraging spatial price differentials, 
(ii) gains from supplying into market 1 through short-term trading as opposed to forward 
contracting, and (iii) the revenue from futures trading, respectively. 
The expected value and variance of the revenue to the producer are, with cross-hedging, 
 
(7) E[TRSC] = E[Pmax − b fCO,1]Q + b fCO,0 Q 
 V[TRSC] = V[Pmax − b fCO,1]Q2  
 
and without cross-hedging, 
 
(8) E[TRS] = E[Pmax]Q  
 V[TRS] = V[Pmax]Q2  
 
In (7), V[Pmax − b fCO,1] < V[Pmax] if crude oil price and regional gas prices are correlated and 
V[Pmax − b fCO,1] decreases with the correlation between two prices.  
A major benefit from short-term trading originates in the profit from arbitraging spatial 
price differentials among regional gas markets, which appears as (Pmax − PLNG,1) Q in (2) and 
(6).  On the other hand, a producer is, in general, exposed to a greater price risk than under 
long-term forward contracting.  Moreover, the option to choose its supply destination from 
multiple regional markets can either increase or decrease the spot price risk.  The maximum 
of J regional prices can be less volatile than the spot price in one particular market because an 
                                                        
3 A similar strategy can be constructed also for a buyer of LNG.  
4 The optimal position in the futures market, b, depends on the extent of the correlation between the 
crude oil futures price and regional gas prices.  To find analytically the optimal futures position requires 
one to presume some forms of utility function for an LNG producer and is difficult due to the absence of 
analytical expressions for the distribution of Pmax.  However, an economic intuition suggests that the 
optimal position increase with the correlation of the crude oil futures and regional gas prices. 
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extremely low price in any of J markets is discarded from the calculation of maximum price 
unless all regional prices are similarly low.  It can be also more volatile than a single price 
because a chance of experiencing extremely high price is higher over multiple markets than in 
a single market.   
In terms of expression (2), the second component of the firms revenue, PLNG,1 Q, is almost 
surely more volatile than the revenue from the forward sales, FLNG Q, because the spot gas 
price in market 1 tends to be more volatile than the forward LNG price for the reason 
previously discussed.  However, the additional revenue from spatial arbitrage, TRS1, tends to 
be negatively correlated with the revenue from the spot sales in market 1the first and 
second revenue components tend to be high (low or zero) and low (high), respectively, when 
the regional spot price in market 1 is low (high).  Similarly, the first two components in (6), 
when the firm cross-hedges the spot price risk, are stochastic and negatively correlated.  For 
both cases, the two components of the spot price risk are most likely net positivethe firms 
revenue from spot sales is more volatile than its revenue from forward sales.  Whether the 
firm shifts from long-term forward trading to short-term trading depends on the relative size 
of these benefits and costs associated with such transition. 
Two remarks are worth emphasizing.  First, the above comparison of the revenue from 
short-term LNG trading with the revenue from forward contracting signifies the difference 
between the valuations to be provided in this study and that provided by Hayes (2006).  The 
value of flexible LNG supply Hayes reported corresponds to the first components in (2) and 
(6), (Pmax − PLNG,1) Q.  The second term in (2), the revenue from spot sales in market 1, is 
almost surely more volatile that the volatility of forward revenue.  Similarly, the second term 
in (6), representing the gains from supplying to the market 1 through short-term trading as 
opposed to long-term forward trading, is non-zero and stochastic because the nearby futures 
price of crude oil price, converted into LNG term through the forward pricing formula, does 
not converge to the spot LNG price.  These incremental revenue risks are the cost to LNG 
producers to gain the arbitrage profit through short-term trading, in the absence of well 
developed spot and futures markets for natural gas in Asia. 
Second, the firms revenue has been compared between the two extreme cases in the 
above; either full hedge or no hedge at all in both forward and futures market.  Full forward 
cover has been conventionally a dominant strategy among many LNG producers.  A more 
realistic strategy would be a partial forward cover and partial hedging.  Suenaga (2007) 
considers such partial hedging strategy in the context of LNG industry and illustrates taht an 
optimal positions of LNG producer in forward and futures markets depend on the 
7 
distributions of spot LNG prices in regional markets and spot and futures prices of an 
alternative fuels.  The simulation model in the subsequent section aims to examine the 




3. SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF RISKS AND RETURNS  
FROM SPOT LNG TRADING 
 
This section describes the model to evaluate the distribution of the revenue to a hypothetical 
producer from supplying LNG under each of four trading strategies examined in Section 2.  
In particular, the model considers an LNG producer located in the North West Shelf (NWS), 
Australia, who has finalized its decision to invest on an LNG production project, including 
development of natural gas reserves and facilities necessary to liquefy gas and load onto LNG 
cargos.  On its sales side, the producer can either commit to supply under a long-term 
supply/purchase arrangement or to sell its product entirely through short-term trading.5,6  In 
the former case, it supplies all its production capacity to Japan at the price determined by the 
spot price of crude oil according to the pricing formula.  In the latter case, the firm can choose 
from multiple regional gas markets and supply its product to the market where the price, net 
of transportation cost, is the highest of all the possible destinations.  For simplicity, I consider 
only two such destinations, a hypothetical spot market in Japan and the US west coast.  The 
model can be easily extended into the case with more than two regional markets.  In addition, 
under each of the two scenarios, the firm can cross-hedge its price risk with crude oil futures.  
The firms revenue is compared across these trading strategies to make inference about the 
firms incentive to move from a conventional trading practice of long-tern supply 
arrangement to short-term trading. 
Section 2 has illustrated that the firms revenue from short-term trading and forward 
contracting, depends on the distributions of three prices; (i) the spot gas prices in Japan and 
the US market, (ii) the spot price of crude oil as it determines the forward price of LNG 
supplied to Japan, and (iii) the futures price of crude oil if the firm cross-hedges.  Although it 
is desirable to evaluate the distributions of firms revenue based on the empirical 
                                                        
5 1 metric ton of LNG is equivalent to 52 MBTu, so the production capacity of this hypothetical producer 
is Q/52 metric tons of LNG.  
6 Of course, a partial hedgingsupply only part of its production capacity under long-term forward 
contract and keeps remaining capacity for spot salesis certainly possible and more realistic.  However, 
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distributions of these three prices, an issue is the absence of reliable spot gas price data for 
Japan or any other regions in Asia.7  Therefore, I evaluate the risks and returns from short-
term LNG trading by a simulation method, which involves the following two steps.  First, I 
estimate the models of stochastic dynamics of crude oil and HH natural gas prices using the 
historical data.  Second, I derive the simulated data on the three prices from the estimates of 
these models and obtain the distributions of revenues to an LNG producer for each of the 
four trading strategies.   
 
3.1 A model of commodity price dynamics 
The stochastic properties of HH natural gas and crude oil spot price are depicted by 
estimating the following model of commodity price dynamics, 
 
(9) Pi,t = fi(t) + gi(t) ei,t 
 
where Pi,t is the spot price of commodity i (i = 1 for CO, =2 for NG).  The model (9) 
decomposes the daily spot price of commodity i into two components; the deterministic or 
seasonal variation as captured by fi(t), and the stochastic component, gi(t) ei,t, specified as the 
product of gi(t) representing seasonal variation in the variance of the deviation from the 
seasonal mean price, and the error term, ei,t, with E[ei,t] = 0 and V[ei,t] = 1 for all t and i.   
I specify the stochastic term, ei,t, to follow an AR(1) process, 
 
(10) ei,t = ρi ei,t−1 + ui,t 
 
and the innovation, ui,t, to follow bivariate GARCH(1,1) process with constant conditional 
correlation of Bollerslev (1990).  That is, for ut = (u1,t, u2,t), 
 
(11) E[utut |ℑ t1] = Ht = Dt R Dt 
 Dt = ),( 2/1 ,22
2/1
,11 tt hhdiag  
                                                                                                                                                               
I do not consider such partial hedging strategy here because to find an optimal forward cover requires a 
development of a micro economic model taking into account the risk preference of the producer.   
7 This is simply because, unlike for crude oil and the US natural gas, well-developed gas markets are 
absent in the region.  The best available data, to the extent of my knowledge, is the price induced from 
the trade statistics from the Japan Customs office.  However, these prices, derived as the ratio of import 
value to import volume, merely represent the average of spot and forward price because the volume 
and value data do not distinguish between LNG imports under long-term forward contract and that 
imported on a temporal basis (spot trade).  These average prices also exhibit large cross-sectional 
variations among the origins, reflecting the heterogeneity of LNG pricing formulas.   
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 hii,t = γi,0 + γi,1 hii,t1 + γi,2 (ui,t−1)2 
 
where R = (rij) is a symmetric positive definite matrix with rii = 1 and rij = ρji for i ≠ j, and 
γi,0 = (1 − ρ i 2)(1 − γi,1 − γi,2) for V[ei,t] = 1.   













































































where τt is the day in year of observation t. 
The above specification allows the model to capture three important features about the 
co-movements of the prices of the two commodities.  First, the difference in the expected 
prices of the two commodities exhibit seasonal variations as determined by fi(t).  Second, the 
variance and covariance of the deviations from these expected prices exhibit seasonal 
variations as determined by relative magnitudes of gi(t).  Third, the correlation between the 
two prices is time-variant because of the seasonal variations in mean and variance as well as 
the  GARCH (1,1) process specified separately for the two commodities. 
The model defined in (9) through (13) is estimated with the data on daily spot prices of 
Henry Hub (HH) natural gas price and Brent crude oil, for the period between November 1, 
1993 and March 23, 2007.8  The two prices are quoted in US dollar per barrel for crude oil and 
US dollar per million British Thermal Unit (MBTu) for Henry Hub natural gas.9  They are 
transformed into log-price in estimating the model. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the price data used in the analysis.  In the 
table, two prices exhibit a wide variation.  HH natural gas price has ranged from US$1.035 to 
$19/MBTu whereas the Brent crude oil has ranged from US$9.65 through $78.74/bbl.  These 
wide variations translate into large standard errors, approximately 60% and 55% of mean 
price, respectively, for HH natural gas and Brent crude oil.  Two prices are also skewed 
positive, primarily due to recently observed dramatic increase of the two prices as shown in 
Figure 1.  
                                                        
8 I also estimated the model with the spot oil price from the West Texas Intermediate.  However, the use 
of different oil price data does not alter qualitatively the model estimates or its implications for risk and 
returns to spot trading presented in subsequent sections. 
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Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating the model defined in (9) through (13) by the 
maximum likelihood.10  In the table, the coefficient estimate of ρ is 0.9834 and 0.9925 for 
natural gas and crude oil, respectively.  They are both significantly less than unity, indicating 
that the deviation from seasonal mean price is highly persistent yet stationary.  The 
conditional variance of the deviation from the seasonal mean, standardized by the estimated 
seasonal variance function, gi(t), is also highly persistent with the estimates of the two 
GARCH coefficients sum to 0.9051 for natural gas and 0.9517 for crude oil, indicating that the 
conditional variance is highly persistent but stationary.   
Figures 2 and 3 plot the estimated mean price and seasonal volatility against the day of 
the year.  In Figure 2, the natural gas price indicates the strong seasonality with mean price 
substantially higher during winter high-demand season (November through February).  
Slight decrease in the mean price over the spring through summer months is rather 
unexpected and possibly capturing gradual adjustment after unusually high prices in winter 
2000-01 and 2002-03.  In contrast, the estimated mean price of crude oil is almost constant 
throughout the year with no noticeable variations across seasons.  The estimated functions, 
fi(t), account for reasonably large share of spot price variation for both commodities
approximately 69.4% and 71.7% for natural and crude oil, respectively.  Similarly, in Figure 3, 
the volatility of spot natural gas price exhibits strong seasonal pattern whereas the volatility 
of spot crude oil price is almost flat throughout the year.  The depicted seasonality for natural 
gas is expected from seasonal pattern of the US natural gas demand.  The volatility is highest 
in the beginning of the year, during which high residential demand for space heating exceeds 
the contemporaneous supply capacity and, hence, demand or supply shocks of even a small 
magnitude can cause large price swings.  The volatility is low in spring and summer months 
because gas demand is well below contemporaneous supply capacity.  Demand and supply 
shocks can be accommodated by adjusting production and/or amount injected into the 
underground storage for the use in the subsequent winter peak-demand season.  These 
seasonal patterns imply potential arbitrage opportunity, particularly during the winter 
months. 
                                                                                                                                                               
9 Difference in measurement does not affect the estimation result since the log-transformation only adds 
a constant to all observations. 
10 I estimated the model in two steps.  First, I estimated the model defined in (9) through (13) 
individually for crude oil and natural gas, ignoring the cross-sectional correlation coefficient, r12.  The 
cross-sectional correlation is then estimated as the sample correlation of the standardized residuals from 
the estimates to the two models.  This two-step method yields consistent estimates of all model 
parameters (Bollerslev, 1990). 
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Table 3 compares different correlation measures calculated for the two prices.  In the 
table, a correlation coefficient for two prices is 0.8593 before controlling for seasonality.  The 
correlation drops to 0.5237 once seasonal variation in mean price is controlled for, and further 
down to 0.1290 once autoregressive process is controlled for.  That is, given the information 
available as of today, the movements in two prices on a subsequent day are only 13% 
correlated.   
 
3.2 Simulation Model 
The simulated data on the US spot natural gas price are derived directly from the model 
estimated in Section 3.1.  These prices, for delivery at the HH, are then transformed into the 
FOB price effective to the producer located in NWS by subtracting the transportation and 
regasification cost.  For the transportation cost, the EIAs estimate for shipping from Australia 
to Everett, Massachusetts is US$1.76 per MBTu equivalent of LNG (EIA, 2003).  As of 2007, an 
LNG receiving terminal is under construction in Costa Azul, Baja, Mexico, which is expected 
to receive LNG from Asian producers (EIA, 2007).  The cost to ship Costa Azul from the NWS 
is, hence, estimated as US$1.18/MBTu by multiplying the cost to Everett by the ratio of the 
distance to these two receiving terminals in nautical miles (7,955/11,874).  For the 
regassification cost, the EIAs estimate of US$0.30 per MBTu equivalent of LNG is used (EIA, 
2003).   
The simulated data on crude oil spot price are also directly derived from the models of 
natural gas and crude oil price dynamics estimated in Section 3.1.  The resulting price needs 
to be transformed into the forward price of LNG price.  While exact pricing formulas are not 
available to the public, three types of formulas have been commonly used (Chabrelie, 2003).  
The simplest one defines the LNG price to be a fixed proportion of the crude oil price, that is, 
PLNG = bPJCC.  The second formula adds a positive constant to the first formula, PLNG = a + bPJCC.  
Naturally, the slope coefficient is set smaller for the second than for the first so the LNG price 
is less responsive to the volatility of crude oil price.  The third formula, called an S-curve, 
adds compensation factors to the second formula so that the LNG price is even less 
responsive to the crude oil price when the crude oil price takes the values below or above the 
predetermined threshold levels.  Chabrelie (2003) reports that a formula in the first type is 
getting more common.  Therefore, I use the following affine formula to convert the spot crude 
oil price into the forward LNG price,11 
                                                        
11 Chabrelie (2003) introduces the two formula; FLNG = 0.8966 + 0.1485 PJCC, and FLNG = 0.1515 PJCC, where 
PJCC is the Japanese custom cleared price of a basket of crude oil.  The first formula applies to the LNG 
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(15) FLNG,t = 0.1500 PJCC,t 
 
where the slope coefficient of 0.1500 corresponds to the conversion factor of 6.667MBTu/bbl of 
oil.  The resulting price represents the FOB price to export to Japan, which is comparable to 
the HH spot natural gas price, net of the transportation cost from the NWS to the Costa Azul. 
The LNG price in a hypothetical spot market in Japan is simulated around the forward 
LNG price.  In the base case, the spot price is set equal to the forward LNG price as provided 
by equations (15).  This represents the case where Japanese importers purchase LNG supplied 
under short-term trade at the price applicable to the LNG imports under long-term supply 
arrangement.  In the other scenarios, I allow the spot LNG price to deviate from the forward 
LNG price according to the following stochastic process, 
 
(16)  tLNGLNGtLNGtLNG eFP ,
2
,, )1ln(2
1lnln ++−= σ   
 ttLNGLNGtLNG uee += −1,, ρ  
  ))1)(1ln(,0(~ 22 LNGLNGt Nu ρσ −+  
 
In (16), the stochastic term, tLNGe , , represents the proportional deviation of the spot LNG price 
from the forward LNG price, tLNGF , .  The LNG spot price in Japan is likely to be more volatile 
than the crude oil price (or its linear function) as it is much smaller market than the crude oil 
market.  eLNG,t, intends to capture this additional volatility of regional gas price.  It is assumed 
to follow an AR(1) process because the short-term fluctuation in gas market is likely to be 
serially correlated, as observed in the US market.  eLNG,t has unconditional distribution 
( ))1ln(,0 2LNGN σ+ .  Thus, the expected value and variance of tLNGP ,  are, conditional on tLNGF , , 
 
(18) tLNGtLNG FPE ,, ][ =  
  22 ,, ][ LNGtLNGtLNG FPV σ=  
 
The presumption in the above specification is that the spot price in a hypothetical LNG 
market in Japan has the unconditional mean of the forward LNG price.  The assumption is 
                                                                                                                                                               
sales between Qatar and Japan and it converts the JCC price into the c.i.f. price with the intercept 
representing transportation cost.  The second formula applies to the LNG sales between Oman and 
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reasonable if the prevailing LNG pricing formula is chosen so that the resulting LNG price 
represents an unbiased forecast of the future relationships between spot crude oil and spot 
LNG price in Japan.  Values of two parameters are set as σLNG = 0.20 and ρLNG = 0.90 in the base 
case.  A range of values are considered in simulation, σLNG ranging from 0 to 0.50 and ρLNG 
ranging from 0 to 0.90.   
 
3.3 Simulation Results 
In the simulation, I generate one year of daily simulated data in the three prices, PJP, PUS, and 
FLNG, and calculate annual revenue to the LNG producer under the four different trading 
strategies.  In calculating the firms revenue from short-term trading, I assume that the 
arbitraging decision as well as processing and shipping of LNG are instantaneous.  That is, 
the LNG producer can costlessly and instantaneously find a trading partner who agrees to 
pay the currently prevailing spot price for a delivery in a subsequent date.  The simulation 
also assumes that the futures price of crude oil is an unbiased forecast of the spot price at the 
delivery date.  Another assumption is that the LNG produce has the same forecast as the 
futures price of crude oil about spot price of crude oil in the subsequent period.  The Monte 
Carlo distributions of the three prices as well as the firms annual revenues are obtained 
through 1,000 replications. 
Figure 4 illustrates one realization, out of 1000 replications, of one-year of simulated price 
series.  In panel (a) of the figure, the simulated crude oil price is declining, which is purely a 
random outcome.  The spot natural gas price in panel (b) exhibits no downward trend 
because its deviation from the long-run mean price exhibits almost no correlation from the 
deviation of the spot crude oil price from its seasonal mean.  The simulated forward LNG 
price, on the other hand, follows the same movement as observed for the crude oil, as it is a 
linear function of the crude oil price.  The simulated spot gas price in Japan moves around the 
simulated forward LNG price.  The deviation from forward LNG price is reasonably large in 
the base case scenario and increases with the values of the variance parameter σLNG while its 
persistence increases with the AR(1) parameter ρLNG assumed in the data generating process. 
Table 4 provides a summary statistics of the simulated price series.  These numbers are 
the average of 1,000 values, each of which is calculated for one realization of one-year data.  
In the first two columns of Table 4, the annual mean of the simulated crude oil and HH 
natural gas prices, net of transportation cost, are US$59.249/bbl and US$6.706/MBTu, 
respectively.  The annual mean price of the forward LNG price is US$8.887/MBTu, which is 
                                                                                                                                                               
Japan and provides the FOB price.  Other studies (Bartsch, 1998; Fujime, 2002) also report the similar 
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approximately 33% higher than the HH natural gas price due to the high crude oil price as 
well as the transportation cost from the NWS to the west coast US.  The standard deviation is 
7.131, 2.231, and 1.070, respectively, for crude oil, HH natural gas, and the LNG forward 
price.  These numbers correspond to 12.0, 33.3, and 12.0% of the respective mean price, 
signifying high volatility of HH natural gas price as compared to the other two prices.  The 
minimum and maximum price observed in 1,000 realizations of one-year sample are, 
respectively, $28.634 and $119.667/bbl for crude oil and $1.077 and $96.505/MBTu for HH 
natural gas (not presented in Table 4).  These price ranges are wider than price variations 
observed in the past, yet, are plausible considering that 1,000 replications correspond to 1,000 
years worth of observations.   
In columns 4 though 6 of Table 4, the average of LNG price in the hypothetical Japanese 
market is approximately equal to the forward LNG price for any sets of values considered for 
two parameters characterizing the stochastic process of the spot LNG price (σLNG and ρLNG).  
On the other hand, the standard deviation increases with σLNG as expected, while it decreases 
slightly with ρLNG which is due to a non-linearity of the specified data generating process.  The 
spot LNG price exhibits roughly the same level of volatility as the HH natural gas price in the 
base parameter values.   
The last three columns of Table 4 provide the same descriptive statistics for the 
maximum of the spot LNG price and the HH natural gas price.  They show that the average 
of the maximum of the two prices is substantially higher than the average spot price in either 
of the two regional markets.  It also increases with the variance of the spot LNG price in Japan 
while it is not very sensitive to the serial dependence of the spot LNG price.  In other words, 
the expected return from the spatial arbitrage is higher when LNG price in the hypothetical 
Japanese spot market is more volatile.  The standard deviation of the maximum of two prices 
increases with the value of σLNG, yet the sensitivity is much weaker than that observed for a 
single LNG price.  In other words, the maximum of the two prices is more volatile than each 
of the two regional prices when the two regional prices are not very volatile whereas it is less 
volatile than the two regional prices when the two regional prices are very volatile.  These 
sensitivities imply that a recent increase in the US natural gas price has raised an expected 
arbitrage profit while reduced the volatility of gains from spatial arbitrage.  
Table 5 summarizes the annual revenue to the LNG producer per MBTu of daily 
production capacity.12  Of the four trading strategies considered, a conventional forward 
                                                                                                                                                               
formula for the LNG export to Japan and other Asian countries. 
12 Annual revenues reported in this section are the sum of the effective prices over one year.  In reality, 
shipment does not take place everyday.  These values can be converted into a revenue per cargo per 
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trading without cross-hedging generates the expected annual revenue of US$3,244 per MBTu 
production capacity.  The standard deviation of this annual revenue is US$375 or 11.6% of the 
expected revenue.  These numbers indicate that an LNG producer is exposed to a high price 
risk even under a current business practice of committing all production capacity under long-
term supply arrangement.  The producer can mitigate this price risk by cross-hedging with 
the crude oil futures while maintaining the same expected revenue as in the case without 
cross-hedging, if the futures market is unbiased as a forecast of future spot price.   
Columns 2 though 4 of Table 5 show the mean and standard deviation of the sum over 
one year of the maximum of the two spot gas prices; LNG price in Japan and HH natural gas 
price.  These numbers represent the mean and standard deviation of annual revenue to the 
LNG producer who supplies its product to either of the US and Japanese spot market, the one 
where the price is higher than in the other market on daily basis.  In the base case scenario, 
the mean revenue is 5.9% (or US$192.24) above the level when the firm does not arbitrage 
spatial price differentials.  This expected benefit from spatial arbitrage increases with the 
volatility of the spot LNG price in a hypothetical Japanese market whereas it is insensitive to 
the serial correlation of the spot LNG price in the Japanese market.   
In the bottom half of the table, the standard deviation of annual revenue, in the base case, 
is approximately 7.6% higher than in the case where the firm supplies under the long-term 
forward contract.  This increase in the firms revenue volatility attributes to two factors.  First, 
the firm is exposed to high volatility of regional spot gas prices even in the absence of spatial 
arbitrage.  Second, as discussed in Section 2, the maximum of two regional prices can be less 
or more volatile than each of the two spot gas prices.  In the base case, the maximum of the 
two prices is more volatile than the two regional prices as shown in Table 4.  That is, the 
option to choose from the two markets exposes the firm to even greater revenue risk than the 
case without spatial arbitrage.  This effect of spatial arbitrage on the volatility of the firms 
revenue reverses as the volatility of the spot LNG price in a hypothetical Japanese market 
increases (i.e., high σLNG).  We previously observed in Table 4 that the maximum of the two 
regional prices is less volatile than the spot LNG price in a hypothetical Japanese market 
when σLNG is high.  In Table 5, the volatility of the firms revenue increases with the values of 
the two parameters characterizing the stochastic process of the spot LNG price in Japan.  The 
revenue volatility increases with σLNG simply because the firm is exposed to greater price risk.  
It increases with ρLNG because high ρLNG means that extremely low or high spot LNG prices are 
                                                                                                                                                               
year by multiplying the size of an LNG cargo, usually 138,000 cubic meters and dividing by 60, the days 
that it takes for a roundtrip between the NWS to the US west coast.   
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more likely to be observed in consecutive days.  The sensitivity to the values of two 
parameters can be compared with the sensitivity of the volatility of the revenue to the firm 
supplying through short-term trading but only to the Japanese market (columns 5 through 7 
of Table 5).  The revenue volatility under this trading strategy also increases with the values 
of the two parameters, but by magnitude much greater than the case where the firm arbitrage 
spatial price differentials.  For the range of values considered for the two parameters, the 
revenue volatility is lower with the spatial arbitrage than with the spatial arbitrage when both 
parameters are very high (σLNG ≥ 0.4 and ρLNG = 0.9).   
Columns 8 through 10 of Table 5 present the mean and standard deviation of the annual 
sum of the difference between the maximum of the two spot gas prices and the forward LNG 
price.  These numbers represent the expected value and volatility of the revenue to the LNG 
producer who supplies to regional spot gas markets through short-term trading and, at the 
same time, hedges its spot price risk with crude oil futures.  The total revenue to the firm is 
this spot revenue plus the revenue from taking a short position in crude oil futures, which is 
equal to the average forward price of LNG (US$3244 annually).  The numbers shown in the 
top half of Table 5 are roughly same as the difference between the annual revenue to the 
producer who supplies through short-term trading (columns 2 through 4) and the revenue to 
the producer who supplies entirely through forward contract (column 1).  What is interesting 
here is the standard deviationthey are much smaller than the volatility of the revenue to the 
firm who supplies to the regional spot markets and does not cross-hedge its spot price risk 
(columns 2 through 4).  The difference, representing the revenue volatility reduced by cross-
hedging, is US$191.59 in the base case, which is 47.5% reduction from the case without cross-
hedging.  In other words, almost half of the revenue volatility is mitigated through cross-
hedging with crude oil futures.  As for the case without cross-hedging, the revenue volatility 
increases with the values of two parameters characterizing the stochastic properties of the 
spot LNG price in Japan.  However, it is much more sensitive to the values of the two 
parameters than the sensitivity observed previously.   
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the annual revenue under three of the four trading 
strategies considered.  For the fourth strategy, if the producer supplies under forward 
contract and cross-hedges its forward price risk, its annual revenue is deterministic at 
US$3,244 per MBTu capacity.  In panel (a) of Figure 5, annual revenue to the producer 
supplying under forward contract without cross-hedging has the expected revenue of 
US$3,244 and standard deviation of US$375.  The firms revenue is also slightly skewed 
positive, due primarily to the positively skewed distribution of the spot crude oil price.  Panel 
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(b) shows that the revenue to the firm supplying through short-term trading has both mean 
and volatility higher than the revenue to the firm supplying under forward contract.  The 
revenue is also more positively skewed, primarily because the distribution of the maximum 
of the two spot prices is skewed positive. 
In panel (c) of Figure 5, substantial reduction in the volatility of firms revenue through 
cross-hedging results in the distribution of annual revenue to be concentrated around the 
mean revenue around the same mean value (US$3,436).  The difference in the expected 
revenue from the case where firm supplies under forward contracting and hedges the 
forward price risk is US$192.  Therefore, the trade-off is between this increment in the 
expected annual revenue per unit production capacity and US$212 of uncertainty in the 
revenue to the firm supplying through short-term trade.  Besides, the firms revenue from 
supplying through short-term trading and cross-hedging is highly positively skewed.  This 
positive skewness attributes to that of the maximum of the regional gas pricesoption to 
supply one of the two prices mitigates the downside price risk more than upside price risk.  
Out of 1,000 replications, the annual revenue is below US$3,436 only in 91 realizations, that is, 
only 9% probability that the firms revenue is below the mean.  As for the sensitivity to the 
values of the two parameters characterizing the stochastic process of the spot LNG price in 
Japan, the probability that the revenue from short-term trading is below the revenue from 
forward trading decreases further from 9% with the volatility of hypothetical spot LNG price 
while increases with its persistence.   
Figure 7 illustrates the frequency of the firm supplying into the US market and its 
sensitivity to the values of two parameters characterizing the stochastic properties of the spot 
LNG price in Japan.  In the base case, the firm supplies to the US market frequently during 
the winter peak-demand periodsmore than 40% of time in December and January
whereas it supplies to the US market only occasionally during off-peak demand season.  
Frequent delivery during the winter peak demand season is due to high average price and 
high price volatility in the US market.  Panel (b) illustrates that the frequency of US delivery 
increases, particularly for off-peak demand seasons, with the volatility of the spot LNG price 
in Japan while it is not sensitive to the persistence of the shocks to the hypothetical spot LNG 






Unlike for the case in the Atlantic region considered by Hayes, spot gas markets are not well 
developed in Japan and other countries in Asia.  The absence of liquid spot market prevents 
the strategy considered by Hayes (2006)to arbitrage spatial price differentials while 
securing its price under long-term supply arrangement.  Another feature common to current 
LNG trading practice is that the forward price of LNG is stochastic as it is linked to the spot 
price of an alternative fuel.  The analysis in this study has incorporated these features and 
examined the risks and returns to short-term LNG trading as opposed to a conventional 
practice of supplying under long-term bilateral supply/purchase arrangement in Asia-Pacific 
region.   
The models of spot price dynamics estimated in this study have depicted strong seasonal 
variation in mean and variance of the spot natural gas price at Henry Hub.  In contrast, Brent 
crude oil, as an alternative fuel to which the forward LNG price is linked, exhibits virtually 
no seasonal pattern in mean and variance.  The depicted price dynamics implies a potential 
for a positive expected returns from arbitraging a spatial price difference between Asia and 
the US through short-term trading.   
The simulation model constructed around the estimated price dynamics illustrates that 
an increase in the firms revenue from short-term trading is about 6% of the expected revenue 
from forward contracting.  However, the volatility of the revenue from short-term trading is 
also high with standard deviation about 12% of mean annual revenue.  Nonetheless, the LNG 
producers supplying under forward trading also faces with high forward price risk due to 
high volatility of forward LNG price, reflecting that of the spot crude oil price.  An increment 
in revenue volatility is not large enough to reject the possibility of LNG producers shifting 
from conventional practice of long-term forward contracting to short-term trading.   
The simulation also is also considered for the case where an LNG producer cross-hedges 
its price risk with the futures markets for the commodity to which the forward LNG price is 
linked.  Such cross-hedging strategy signifies the gains from short-term LNG trading as 
opposed to forward contracting.  The expected incremental revenue from short-term trading 
is about 6% of the revenue from forward contracting while the revenue volatility is less than 
7% of the mean revenue.  The most noticeable difference, from the case where the firm does 
not cross-hedge is that the firms revenue from short-term trading is highly positively 
skewedthe revenue from the spot sales exceeds the revenue from forward sales more than 
90% of time.  Revenue below the mean is realized only 9% of time out of 1,000 replications.  
This low downside risk for short-term LNG trading is attributable to the option to choose 
from multiple regional markets to which the producer supplies in the spot market. 
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These results indicate that the historical prices of the US natural gas and crude oil imply a 
positive return from the short-term LNG trading with reasonably low risk, even in the 
absence of well-developed regional gas markets in Asia.  However, whether LNG producers 
actually shift to short-term trade also depends on other factors.  Among these, the quantity 
risk will be an important factor, as reflected in a common discussion that spot LNG trading 
will become more active as more liquefaction facilities recover the initial investment costs in 
near future.  Quantity risk and cost associated with finding trading partners through short-
term trade will remain high in the absence of well-developed gas market in Asia and 
discourage LNG producers from shifting to short-term trading from a conventional practice 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of natural gas and crude oil daily spot prices 
 
 Sample: Nov. 1, 1993 - Mar. 23, 2007 
 
Natural Gas Crude Oil
Mean 4.022 28.845




Maximum 19 78.74  
 
 
Table 2 Maximum Likelihood estimation of the spot price dynamics of crude oil and 
natural gas 
 
           Sample: Nov. 1, 1993 - Mar. 23, 2007 
NG CO
Coefficient Std. Err. t -ratio Coefficient Std. Err. t -ratio
Mean price function
Constant 0.2166 0.0622 3.482 2.4455 0.0500 48.900
Time trend** 1.7840 0.1057 16.874 1.5839 0.1215 13.037
s1 -0.0229 0.0308 -0.746 -0.0130 0.0190 -0.683
c1 0.0543 0.0404 1.343 -0.0315 0.0180 -1.757
s2 -0.0476 0.0213 -2.232 -0.0066 0.0092 -0.712
c2 0.0576 0.0217 2.652 0.0041 0.0093 0.437
s3 -0.0001 0.0134 -0.007 0.0079 0.0063 1.248
c3 0.0389 0.0151 2.580 0.0023 0.0059 0.393
s4 0.0182 0.0109 1.678 0.0055 0.0046 1.213
c4 0.0222 0.0099 2.255 0.0002 0.0048 0.050
s5 0.0099 0.0083 1.195 -0.0008 0.0038 -0.199
c5 0.0027 0.0067 0.406 -0.0026 0.0036 -0.720
Variance function
Constant 0.2697 0.0295 9.157 0.1704 0.0174 9.765
s1 -0.0219 0.0249 -0.881 0.0066 0.0069 0.956
c1 0.1286 0.0380 3.379 0.0028 0.0065 0.429
s2 0.0345 0.0256 1.346 0.0012 0.0043 0.284
c2 0.0494 0.0283 1.747 -0.0062 0.0053 -1.153
s3 0.0294 0.0162 1.811 -0.0018 0.0037 -0.476
c3 0.0259 0.0254 1.021 0.0021 0.0035 0.613
s4 0.0007 0.0105 0.062 -0.0031 0.0029 -1.066
c4 0.0200 0.0181 1.105 0.0040 0.0032 1.244
s5 -0.0017 0.0073 -0.229 0.0006 0.0026 0.218
c5 0.0031 0.0106 0.291 -0.0006 0.0023 -0.247
AR(1) and GARCH
ρ i 0.9834 0.0000 1560.719 * 0.9925 0.0000 4124.765 *
γ1,i 0.6989 0.0024 293.115 0.8844 0.0020 448.765
γ2,i 0.2062 0.0016 125.811 0.0673 0.0004 184.831
γ 1,i  + γ1,i 0.9051 * 0.9517 *
Cross-commodity correlation
r 12 0.1170
* t -ratio is calculated with respect to one .
** Variable takes a value zero for initial observation and one for the last observation in sampling period (Nov. 1, 1993 -
Mar. 23, 2007).  The estimated coefficient of 1.7840 (1.5839) implies that natural gas (crude oil) price increase by 
approximately 13% (12%) every year.  
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Table 3 Cross-commodity price correlation with and without controlling for known 
variations 
 
  Sample: Nov. 1, 1993 - Mar. 23, 2007 
 
Symbol as in Description Sample correlation
Eqns. (1)-(5)
Pt  Price 0.8593
f (t ) Predicted seasonal mean price 0.9841
Pt  - f (t ) Deviation from seasonal mean 0.5237
et / g (t ) Deviation standardized by seasonal volatility 0.5238
ut Innovation 0.1290
ht Conditional variance 0.1794
ut / ht Innovation standardized by conditional variance 0.1170  
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the simulated price series 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Symbol P CO P HH F LNG P LNG P MAX
Description
ρ LNG =   0 0.5 0.9 ρ LNG  =   0 0.5 0.9
Mean
59.249 6.706 8.887 σ LNG =   0 8.887 9.311
0.1 8.888 8.888 8.889 9.337 9.338 9.338
0.2 8.888 8.888 8.889 9.415 9.415 9.414
0.3 8.889 8.889 8.888 9.537 9.537 9.533
0.4 8.890 8.889 8.886 9.690 9.689 9.681
0.5 8.890 8.890 8.885 9.859 9.858 9.846
SD
7.131 2.231 1.070 σ LNG =   0 1.070 1.600
0.1 1.412 1.409 1.386 1.830 1.828 1.811
0.2 2.107 2.100 2.043 2.333 2.328 2.286
0.3 2.908 2.899 2.806 2.941 2.935 2.863
0.4 3.749 3.738 3.605 3.605 3.598 3.490
0.5 4.606 4.595 4.415 4.308 4.302 4.148
Spot crude 
oil price
LNG price in hypotherical Japanese 
spot market
Maximum spot natural gas prices of 








Table 5 Mean and standard deviation of annual revenue to a hypothetical LNG 
producer   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Symbol F LNG P MAX P LNG P MAX  - F LNG
Description Forward 
LNG price
flng ρ LNG  =   0 0.5 0.9 ρ LNG =   0 0.5 0.9 ρ LNG  =   0 0.5 0.9
Mean
σ LNG  =   0 3243.89 3398.50 3243.89 154.62
0.1 3408.14 3408.21 3408.51 3244.03 3244.07 3244.30 164.26 164.32 164.62
0.2 3436.48 3436.48 3436.26 3244.22 3244.24 3244.35 192.59 192.60 192.38
0.3 3481.08 3480.83 3479.55 3244.43 3244.42 3244.07 237.19 236.95 235.67
0.4 3536.81 3536.38 3533.65 3244.67 3244.63 3243.57 292.92 292.50 289.76
0.5 3598.37 3598.02 3593.71 3244.91 3244.88 3242.93 354.48 354.13 349.83
SD
σ LNG  =   0 374.89 402.31 374.89 199.13
0.1 401.75 402.69 408.03 375.93 377.20 384.78 201.20 202.35 210.55
0.2 400.31 403.35 421.83 377.71 381.75 407.42 207.43 211.76 241.59
0.3 400.21 406.25 443.36 380.22 388.39 440.44 216.81 225.54 282.86
0.4 402.73 412.48 472.00 383.47 396.95 481.18 228.00 241.75 328.93
0.5 407.53 421.69 506.45 387.43 407.22 527.30 239.99 259.37 377.51
Maximum spot natural gas prices of 
US and Japanese Market
LNG price in hypotherical Japanese 
spot market
Annual gain from spot trading with 
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Figure 5 Monte Carlo distribution of the annual revenue to a hypothetical LNG 
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Figure 6 Seasonality in the frequency of diversion to the US delivery and its sensitivity 
to the parameters characterizing the stochastic process of a hypothetical spot 
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